Telecoms Package Plenary Voting List

From La Quadrature du Net
Jump to: navigation, search

The following tables present a voting list with some comments only about amendment raising concerns for La Quadrature du Net. The printable (PDF) files give voting lists with all amendments put to vote, as shown in European Parliament's voting list format.

Contents

COD/2007/0247 - Trautmann report (networks and services)

Amending Amended Topic Am. # Source Advice Comment
Trautmann Art. 2.6a Access Art. 9.1 Net Neutrality 98 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "restrictions ... policies" ITRE 0 no objections on this part
" " " 98 part 2: "restrictions ... policies" " -- restrictions on access to services and applications endangers net neutrality
Trautmann Art. 2.8 Access Art. 12 Net Neutrality 100 part 1: Everything except paragraph 2e) ITRE + no objections on this part, and even some good support for interoperability
" " " 100 part 2: paragraph 2e) " -- obligations about "intellectual property rights" (paragraph 2, point e) is out-of-scope
Trautmann Annex I.2.g Authorisation Annex I.A.19 Net Neutrality 120 ITRE ++ deletion is good, since relation with EUCD and IPRED is out-of-scope
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea Framework Art. 8.4.g Net Neutrality 139 Verts/ALE ++ restrictions subject to criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e Framework Art. 8.4.g Net Neutrality 130=142 IND/DEM + GUE/NGL ++ delete "lawful"
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e Framework Art. 8.4.g Net Neutrality 61 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "and for this purpose ... lawful content" ITRE - can still be dangerous with reference to Universal Service directive if amendment 112 Harbour is voted
" " " 61 part2: "and for this purpose ... lawful content" " -- notion of "lawful" threatens net neutrality and is out-of-scope of Telecoms Package
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea Framework Art. 8.4.ga 3-strikes 132 part 1: "(ea) In paragraph 4 ... creative content industries" Toubon, Hieronymi and al. - as EDPS has recommended, cooperation between ISP and copyright industry can be good if completed by an amendment to clarify that it should not allow for systematic and proactive surveillance of Internet usage
" " " 132 part 2: in order to foster ... codes of conduct" " -- opens door to 3-strikes approach by "joint-industry solutions"
Trautmann Art. 1.8.ea Framework Art. 8.4.ga Net Neutrality/Judicial Power 138 part 1: "applying the principle ... judicial authorities" excluding "notably in accordance ... expression and information" Bono, Cohn-Bendit, Roithová and al. +++ restore judicial authority
" " " 138 part 2: "notably in accordance ... expression and information" " + restore judicial authority with reference to ECHR
" " " 138 part 3: "except where ... public morality" " ++ restore judicial authority with exceptions imposed by subsidiarity principle
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e Framework Art. 8.4.ga Net Neutrality 131 IND/DEM ++ restrictions can only be dictated by force majeure, network integrity and security or criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality
Trautmann Art. 1.8.e Framework Art. 8.4.ga Net Neutrality 143 GUE/NGL ++ restrictions can only be dictated by force majeure, network integrity and security or criminal law imposed for reasons of public policy, public security or public morality
Trautmann Art. 1.9 Framework Art. 9 Net Neutrality 64 ITRE -- "cultural and media policy objectives" opens door to filtering, stick to "promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity"
Trautmann Art. 1.24a Framework Art. 25a Technology Mandates / Internet Filtering 133 GUE/NGL ++ prevents Internet filtering
Trautmann Art. 2.8.ba Access Art. 12.2 Net Neutrality 141 Verts/ALE ++ delete obligations about "intellectual property rights"

COD/2007/0248 - Harbour report (network user's rights, privacy, consumer protection, ...)

Remark: as you can see on this screenshot (taken on Sep. 23 2008, 14:09), amendments 158 and 166 to Harbour report are not accessible on the European Parliament website, although they are included on the official voting list published by tabling office. We have managed to get a paper copy of amendment 166 and recommend to support it, but content of amendment 158 is still unknown, therefore we advise to reject it by precautionary principle. Update 17:41: both amendments have now been published, it is about security and introduce DRM to render personal data unintelligible,in the event of accidental or unlawful destruction, loss or alteration or unauthorized disclosure of or access to personal data. We still recommend to vote against amendment 158, and for amendment 166.

Amending Amended Topic Am. # Source Advice Comment
Harbour Rec. 14d DRM 14 part1: "Since inconsistent ... across the Community" IMCO - can be dangerous wrt DRM (as part 2) by allowing "other measures"
" " 14 part2: "and, if necessary ... Community" " -- allows DRM imposed by NRAs approved by Commission
Harbour Rec. 28a Privacy 30 part 1: "For the purpose ... with other data" IMCO + LIBE -- IP address as personal data
" " 30 part2: "within two years ... supervisors" " -- IP address as personal data in Community legislation
Harbour Rec. 30a Privacy 34 IMCO + LIBE --- extends ePrivacy to IPR
Harbour Rec. 30b Privacy 35 IMCO + LIBE -- "fundamental rights" include protection of IPR
Harbour Art. 1.12 Universal Service Art. 20.2.1.b Net Neutrality 62 part1: "services provided ... territory" IMCO 0 no objections on this part
" " " 62 part2: "information on ... and services" " -- service providers cannot judge lawfulness without a ruling by judicial authorities
" " " 62 part3: "the service quality ... initial connection" " 0 no objections on this part
" " " 62 part4: "and any ... provider" " -- service providers cannot judge lawfulness without a ruling by judicial authorities
Harbour Art. 1.12 Universal Service Art. 20.2.2 3-strikes 67 part 1: "The contract shall ... networks and services" IMCO 0 no objection on this part
" " " 67 part 2: "to engage ... provided" " -- opens door to 3-strikes approach
Harbour Art. 1.12 Universal Service Art. 21.4 Net Neutrality 75 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "inform subscribers ... of their choice" [sub c)] IMCO 0 no objection on this part
" " " 75 part 2: "inform subscribers ... of their choice" [sub c)] " -- allows restrictions based on lawfulness
Harbour Art. 1.12 Universal Service Art. 21.4a 3-strikes 76 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "the common uses ... their consequences; and" [point a)] IMCO 0 no objection on this part
" " " 76 part 2: "the common uses ... their consequences; and" [point a)] " -- opens door to 3-strikes approach
Harbour Art. 1.20 Universal Service Art. 33.2a 3-strikes 112 IMCO -- opens door to 3-strikes approach
Harbour Art. 1.20 Universal Service Art. 33.3 Interoperability 113 IMCO - weakens interoperability clause
Harbour Art. 1.21 Universal Service Art. 34.1.2a Judicial Power 117 IMCO -- encourages out-of-courts procedures
Harbour Art. 2.5a ePrivacy Art. 14.1 DRM 134 part 1: "in implementing ...technical features" IMCO + LIBE + goes back to current inital version of ePrivacy directive
" " " 134 part 2: "including ... rights by users" " -- allows standardisation of DRM for purposes of detecting, intercepting, or preventing infringements of IPR
" " " 134 part 3: "are imposed ... Member States" " + goes back to current inital version of ePrivacy directive
Harbour Art. 1.13.b Universal Service Art. 22.3 DRM 155=172 IND/DEM + Verts/ALE ++ rewords am193 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access
Harbour Art. 1.13.b Universal Service Art. 22.3 DRM 193 ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE - even if references to "lawfulness" have been deleted since previous amendment 81, still opens doors to standardisation of DRM
Harbour Art. 1.13.b Universal Service Art. 22.3 DRM 81 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the word "lawful" (twice) IMCO 0 no objection on this part
" " " 81 part 2: "lawful" (twice) " -- opens doors to standardisation of DRM
Harbour Art. 1.16 Universal Service Art. 28.2a Net Neutrality 173 Verts/ALE ++ limits restrictions to security and integrity
Harbour Art. 1.16 Universal Service Art. 28.2a Net Neutrality 101 IMCO -- gives power to NRAs for requiring ISPs to impose restrictions
Harbour Art. 1.19a Universal Service Art. 32a 3-strikes 166 GUE/NGL ++ garantees access to content, services and application
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa ePrivacy Art. 4.1a Privacy 156 IND/DEM + Verts/ALE ++ fix am122 by defining security with "integrity, confidentiality and availability" (like preambule of Budapest Convention on Cybercrime)
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa ePrivacy Arts. 4.1a, 4.1b Privacy 122 IMCO + LIBE -- mix lawfulness with security allowing restrictions beyond security purposes
Harbour Art. 2.3.aa ePrivacy Art. 4.1a Privacy 175 IND/DEM + Verts/ALE ++ fix am122 by defining security with "integrity, confidentiality and availability" (like preambule of Budapest Convention on Cybercrime)
Harbour Art. 2.3.b ePrivacy Art. 4.3 Security 187 ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE + final revision of this amendment finally allows users to be notified about breaches of security concerning thier personal data, whatever NRAs or ISPs deem necessary
Harbour Art. 2.3.b ePrivacy Art. 4.3 Security 123 IMCO + LIBE - breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Art. 2.3.b ePrivacy Art. 4.3a Security 124 IMCO + LIBE - breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Art. 2.3.b ePrivacy Art. 4.3b Security 125 IMCO + LIBE - breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Harbour Art. 2.3.b ePrivacy Art. 4.3.1a Security 184 ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE - allows providers to abstain to notify users of a security breach concerning their private data
Harbour Art. 2.3.b ePrivacy Art. 4.4.1 Security 127 IMCO + LIBE 0 implementing measures regarding security of personal data after consulting ENISA, EDPS, Art29 WP and stakeholders
Harbour Art 2.4b ePrivacy Art. 6.6a Privacy 181 PPE-DE + PSE + ALDE + narrows am130 as suggested by EDPS, but without explicit mention of actors of the processing, just "for the legitimate interest of the data controller"
Harbour Art.2.4b ePrivacy Art. 6.6a Privacy 130 IMCO + LIBE -- allows processing of traffic data for broader purposes than pure security
Harbour Art. 2.6a ePrivacy Art. 15.1 Net Neutrality 179 PPE-DE -- extends restrictions to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (including IPR)
Harbour Art. 2.7a ePrivacy Art. 18.1a Privacy 186 ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE ++ asks Commission for a report about use of IP addresses as personal data based on an in-depth study as suggested by EDPS
Harbour Annex I.B.bb Universal Service Annex I.B.bb Protection of childrens 157=163=174 IND/DEM + GUE/NGL + Verts/ALE ++ fix am148 by replacing "control of access to unlawful content" by "prevention of access to unsuitable content" and by limiting use of traffic monitoring data to the user
Harbour Annex I.B.bb Universal Service Annex I.B.bb Protection of childrens 148 part 1: "Member States shall ensure ... vulnerable people" IMCO - still allows control of usages
" " " 148 part 2: "to unlawful or dangerous content" " -- allows control of unlawful usages
Harbour Rec. 12c 3-strikes 9 IMCO -- fosters 3-strikes approach
Harbour Rec. 12c 3-strikes 191 part1: Text as a whole excluding the words "this information ... personal data" ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE 0 takes into account EDPS advices so that 3-strikes approach is not fostered
" " 191 part 2: "this information ... personal data" " -- still mentions relation to copyright infringement, unlawful uses and harmful content, contrary to EDPS advices
Harbour Rec. 12c 3-strikes 169 Verts/ALE ++ takes into account EDPS advices so that 3-strikes approach is not fostered and go further by deleting any suspicious wording
Harbour Rec. 14 Net Neutrality 11 IMCO -- notion of "lawful" threatens net neutrality and is out-of-scope of Telecoms Package
Harbour Rec. 14 Net Neutrality 170 Verts/ALE ++ deletes "lawful" references of am11 and go further by putting first users' freedom
Harbour Rec. 14 Net Neutrality 160 IND/DEM + GUE/NGL + deletes "lawful" references of am11
Harbour Rec. 14 Net Neutrality 153 IND/DEM + GUE/NGL + deletes "lawful" references of am11
Harbour Rec. 14a Net Neutrality 171 IND/DEM + Verts/ALE ++ rewords am12 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access
Harbour Rec. 14a Net Neutrality 154 IND/DEM + Verts/ALE ++ rewords am12 to guarantee access as far as possible instead of restricting access
Harbour Rec. 14a Net Neutrality 12 IMCO -- allows restriction to particular types of content or applications
Harbour Rec. 14b Net Neutrality 177 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "providers of electronic ... such decision" ALDE -- "lawfulness" is decided by "relevant authorities of the Member States"
" " 177 part 2: "providers of electronic ... such decision" " -- ISPs just cooperate
Harbour Rec. 14b Net Neutrality 194 PPE-DE + PSE -- "lawfulness" is decided by "relevant authorities of the Member States", ISPs are not responsible
Harbour Rec. 14c RAND 190 part 1: 'Text as a whole excluding the words "reasonable and" ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE 0 no objection on this part
" " 190 part 2: "reasonable and" " - reference to any "reasonable and non-discriminatory" (RAND) wording should be avoided, since such fuzzyness allows unwanted solutions
Harbour Rec. 14c RAND 13 IMCO - proposes restrictions in direct contradictions with net neutrality
Harbour Rec. 25 3-strikes 192 part 1: Text as a whole excluding the words "Individual" and "furthermore, ... internet usage" ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE 0 no objection on this part
" " 192 part 2: "individual" " --- allows systematic and proactive surveillance of Internet usage, using deceptive wording by preventing against "systematic surveillance of individual internet usage", this is contrary to EDPS opinion
" " 192 part 3: "furthermore, ... internet usage" " + "systematic surveillance of internet usage" is OK
Harbour Rec. 26a Privacy 180 PPE-DE + PSE + ALDE + illustrates the covered types of processing of personal data as suggested by EDPS, but without explicit mention of actors of the processing, just "for the legitimate interest of the data controller"
Harbour Rec. 27a Privacy 185 ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE 0 asks Commission for a study about use of IP addresses as personal data, but EDPS advice was more coercive
Harbour Rec. 28 Privacy 182 ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE -- instead of focusing on safeguards of right to privacy and data protection as in Commission initial proposal, extends the safeguard to all fundamental rights, therefore including protection of IPR
Harbour Rec. 29 Security 183 ALDE + PPE-DE + PSE - NRAs or "other competent national authority" have still to decide seriousness of breaches of security before alerting users
Harbour Rec. 29 Security 33 IMCO + LIBE - breaches of security notified to NRAs, users are notified only if NRAs and ISPs decide so
Personal tools